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Money is changing, whether we want it to or not. Cash use across the eurozone has been declining for years, digital payments have become the default for most transactions, and the infrastructure carrying those payments is increasingly owned by companies outside Europe.

Nearly two-thirds of euro area card transactions are now handled by non-European firms. In 13 countries, there鈥檚 complete reliance on international payment schemes with no domestic alternative.

For Piero Cipollone, a member of the ECB鈥檚 Executive Board, that statistic is the whole argument. In speeches earlier this year, he made the case that a digital euro isn鈥檛 optional, it鈥檚 essential. Without a public, European-owned digital currency, he argues, the continent鈥檚 monetary sovereignty will be quietly eroded by Big Tech payment platforms and private stablecoins operating outside central bank oversight.

The ECB is now in its preparation phase, with legislation expected in 2026, pilots potentially beginning by mid-2027 and issuance targeted for 2029. The 鈥渋f鈥� debate is largely over. The 鈥渨hat kind鈥� debate is just getting started, and it鈥檚 a heated one.

Two Sides Of The Same Coin

The pro-CBDC argument is fundamentally a sovereignty argument, and it has merit. Europe currently depends on payment infrastructure it doesn鈥檛 control, and that dependency carries real economic and geopolitical risk.

A digital euro would offer a public alternative to private payment rails, potentially at lower cost 鈥� merchant fees could drop to roughly half current levels according to ECB projections 鈥� with universal access and offline functionality designed to preserve the privacy properties of physical cash.

Proponents also point to financial inclusion 鈥� across the eurozone, there are populations underserved by traditional banking. A digital euro with guaranteed access and no requirement for a bank account addresses that gap directly. And the geopolitical timing is noteworthy: European leaders called for accelerated development in October 2025, explicitly citing stablecoin risks and rising geopolitical tensions. The message was clear: this is no longer just a monetary policy conversation.

However, the critics aren鈥檛 fringe voices. Members of the European Parliament have raised formal concerns, and they centre on questions that don鈥檛 have comfortable answers.

The first is privacy. The ECB’s offline functionality only covers small transactions 鈥� anything of meaningful size flows through regulated intermediaries, which by law must verify identities, monitor transactions and retain records under EU anti-money laundering rules. The ECB describes this as pseudonymisation and frames it as privacy protection. The distinction that critics draw, however, is between anonymity and pseudonymity: the latter can, under the right circumstances, be reversed. That’s a practical concern that depends entirely on who controls the infrastructure and what future rules permit.

The second is programmability. A digital currency can be programmed 鈥� money that expires, money restricted to certain categories, money that can be withheld based on compliance rules. In the hands of a trustworthy government, that鈥檚 a feature. In any other scenario, it鈥檚 an expansion of state power over individual financial behaviour that no democratic mandate has explicitly authorised.

Where Does The Rest Of The World Stand?

The transatlantic picture sharpens the stakes further. The Bank of England is still in the design phase for a digital pound, with a decision expected post-2026 and legislation required before any rollout.

The UK鈥檚 approach to digital currency regulation has been cautious, prioritising private sector innovation alongside public infrastructure. The US position is stark: a Senate provision passed in March 2026 bans retail CBDC issuance until at least 2030, with the Fed explicitly prioritising private stablecoins over a public digital dollar.

That divergence sets up a real contest between two fundamentally different visions of what money should look like 鈥� one public and state-backed, the other private and market-driven. For fintech founders and operators building across both markets, that鈥檚 a concrete policy debate. It鈥檚 an infrastructure decision they鈥檒l need to build around, and the shape of that infrastructure is being decided right now.

We asked a group of experts across banking, regulation, crypto and consumer rights to weigh in on the most consequential financial debate of 2026.

Our Experts:

• Lissele Pratt: Co-founder of Capitalixe and Forbes 30 Under 30 honouree
• Martin de Rijke: Head of Growth at Maple
• Riccardo Spagni: Entrepreneur and Open Source Contributor
• David Parkinson: Founder and CEO of Musqet
• Joe David: CEO of Nephos Group
• Anthony Yeung: CCO of CoinCover

For any questions, comments or features, please contact us directly.

Lissele Pratt, Co-founder of Capitalixe

鈥淭he digital euro is essentially Europe catching up with reality. Cash is disappearing with online payments exploding, and right now the euro relies heavily on foreign systems like Visa and Mastercard. That鈥檚 a risk. If a private stablecoin suddenly became dominant and then collapsed, the fallout could hit the euro itself. That鈥檚 the kind of fragility the EU can鈥檛 afford.

鈥淗owever, a well-designed digital euro can fix that. It can preserve privacy through offline functionality and encryption, give people real choice in how they pay, and strengthen banks rather than replace them. Most importantly, it safeguards the credibility of the euro, which is still a pretty young currency having been established in 1999. This is about giving Europe the financial tools it needs to stay independent, resilient and ready for the digital age.鈥�

Martin de Rijke, Head of Growth at Maple

鈥淔intech is headed in a much bigger direction and the digital euro is part of that story. As payments and financial products become more digital, more programmable and connected to modern internet infrastructure, this evolution is inevitable. From that angle, the ECB鈥檚 push makes a lot of sense. Central banks don鈥檛 want to lose ground as consumer payment habits evolve due to the rise in private digital currencies.

鈥淭hat said, the future of fintech won鈥檛 be defined by public sector projects alone. A lot of the real innovation is happening in private markets where teams are moving faster and building around real user demand. I don鈥檛 think this becomes a winner-takes-all story between CBDCs and stablecoins. More likely, the next phase of fintech includes a mix of public and private digital money serving different needs. A digital euro could help modernise the baseline for digital payments in Europe, while stablecoins and tokenised dollars continue pushing cross-border payments, capital efficiency and on-chain financial products forward.鈥�

Riccardo Spagni, Entrepreneur and Open Source Contributor

鈥淭he ECB says the digital euro will be 鈥榓s good as cash in terms of preserving privacy.鈥� That鈥檚 the claim. The reality is that the offline mode, the only version that offers genuine anonymity, is capped at 鈧�50 per transaction. Everything above that goes through intermediaries who are required to comply with EU anti-money laundering law, which means identity verification, transaction monitoring and data retention. The ECB says they鈥檒l only see 鈥榩seudonymised鈥� data, but pseudonymised is not anonymous. Metadata analysis on pseudonymised payment flows is a solved problem. Intelligence agencies and commercial data brokers have been doing it for years.

鈥淭he framing that this is about 鈥榤onetary sovereignty鈥� is misleading. Europe already has monetary sovereignty. What the ECB doesn鈥檛 have is a direct window into retail transactions, which currently flow through commercial banks and card networks. A digital euro changes that.

鈥淚鈥檝e spent over a decade building privacy-preserving financial systems. The lesson from that work is simple: if the architecture allows surveillance, surveillance will happen, regardless of what the policy documents promise today. Policies change. Governments change. But infrastructure persists. The question isn鈥檛 whether the people running the ECB today have good intentions. The question is whether you鈥檇 trust every future government with the same infrastructure.鈥�

David Parkinson, Founder and CEO of Musqet

鈥淐alling the digital euro 鈥榚ssential鈥� for monetary sovereignty conflates two different things: control over payment infrastructure versus control over the currency itself. The euro鈥檚 sovereignty already rests on legal tender laws and the ECB鈥檚 mandate, not on whether citizens hold balances in a retail CBDC. What a digital euro really does is extend state control deeper into retail payments.

鈥淎 retail CBDC hard-wires every transaction into an identity-linked, fully digital ledger, making cash-like anonymity impossible. Once programmable central bank money exists, the constraint on what can be done with it becomes political, not technical. Future governments can add controls on who may spend, on what, where and when, turning money into a policy instrument rather than a neutral settlement asset.

鈥淚f the ECB鈥檚 goal is genuine sovereignty, citizens need credible exit options from any single issuer. Bitcoin delivers the opposite of a CBDC: fixed issuance, decentralised validation and true self-custody, giving users a base layer for sovereign savings that cannot be quietly reprogrammed.鈥�

Joe David, CEO of Nephos Group

鈥淭he digital euro debate has shifted from 鈥榠f鈥� to 鈥榳hen鈥�, but the more honest question is 鈥榳hy.鈥� Central banks frame CBDCs as essential to monetary sovereignty, yet the real threat to sovereignty isn鈥檛 stablecoins or Big Tech 鈥� it鈥檚 poorly designed state-controlled alternatives that erode the very trust they claim to protect.

鈥淔rom our work with crypto-native businesses across the UK, UAE and beyond, we see the gap between CBDC ambition and operational reality daily. Businesses already navigate a maze of digital asset regulations. Adding a central bank digital currency without clear tax treatment doesn鈥檛 simplify anything 鈥� it adds another layer of complexity to an already fractured landscape.

鈥淭he private sector has already built faster, cheaper, more transparent payment rails. Rather than competing with that innovation, central banks should be focused on regulating it properly.鈥�

Anthony Yeung, CCO of CoinCover

鈥淭he debate around the digital euro should not just be framed as digital innovation versus privacy or stability. The overarching question is how a new form of digital money can be introduced in a way that is secure, resilient and trusted by the people expected to use it.

鈥淐BDCs may offer potential benefits like faster payments and more efficient cross-border transactions, but that alone won鈥檛 win over sceptics. To date, $350 billion worth of Bitcoin has been irretrievably lost, with wallet access cited as the foremost reason. None of a CBDC鈥檚 benefits will matter if users and institutions remain exposed to loss of access, operational failures or unclear recovery mechanisms. If the infrastructure isn鈥檛 built with security and recovery in mind from the outset, trust will remain fragile.

鈥淔or any digital currency to gain meaningful adoption, whether public or private, it must be supported by robust safeguards that protect access and enable recovery when things go wrong. The real test isn鈥檛 whether a digital euro is technically possible. It鈥檚 whether it can deliver confidence as well as convenience.鈥�

For any questions, comments or features, please contact us directly.